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What is a just society? How to distribute limited resources, opportunities,
access, guarantees, and so forth, to members of a community who are of vastly
different natural and acquired capacities? Perhaps the most promising approach
to an answer is that suggested by John Rawls. Rawls’ famous thoughtexperiment, in A Theory of Justice – the invitation to take up the perspective of
“the original position” and to pick some basic principles on which to base a just
society -- has the simplicity of genius. The particular constraint of having to
make this choice from behind the “veil of ignorance,” and thus not know who one
will be in the imagined society, will be long remembered as a key contribution of
20th century philosophy.
Rawls simply asks us to pick (the rules for) a socio-political system – in a
context materially and psychologically like our current world -- while stripped of
personal favoritisms? Not knowing one’s role in the imagined community to be
organized around the chosen rules induces one to take the broad and impartial
view. It induces one to consider how the basic rules would affect everyone in it.
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Whatever rules one chooses from this impartial perspective are likely to be the
fair rules, since everyone’s interest is likely to be equally considered. Hence this
approach should lead to a community that is fair to all – or at least as fair as any
community can be.[1]
This basic intuition regarding the method for identifying a just system in an
impartial way – choosing among systems without knowing one’s place in any of
them -- is so obvious and elegant that it is a wonder we did not have this intuition
many thousands of years ago.[2] Perhaps the implicit generosity toward the
weaker members of one’s community that a truly impartial viewpoint produces
was echoed in the spiritual teachings of figures like Jesus (in the “Sermon on the
Mount”) or Gautama (in his compassion for sentient beings). Even so, Rawls’
way of formulating and of motivating this view remains distinctive and
remarkable.
While Rawls surely deserves credit for this intellectual contribution, I will
argue that his own use of the justice-identifying method is unduly narrow. That
is, I have some concerns about the membership scope of his ideal community.
The manner in which Rawls applies his method results in a vision of a “just”
community that morally undervalues mentally deprived humans and morally
worthy members of non-human species. This result need not have been the
case. The impartial and generous spirit behind Rawls’ vision can easily be
extended to include these otherwise neglected groups. An attempt at such an
expansion, and a justification for it, are the objectives of this essay.
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Agents and Beneficiaries

We should clearly agree with Rawls regarding who is eligible to play Rawls’
imaginative game. Any rational being interested in a self-serving future would
do. One must possess the capacity for abstract and imaginative thought. In
particular, one must be capable of imagining oneself in the role of someone else
situated in a different context. One does not have to be an actor or a political
thinker to do this. Any college students can do this. On the other hand, young
children, imagination-deprived humans, and cats could not play this game.[3]
Does that mean that those unable to engage in this imaginative exercise
should not be included among the beneficiaries of the exercise? Whose interests
should I represent when I imagine the foundational rules for a society that takes
everyone’s interests into equal account?[4] Should I choose only on behalf of any
fully rational human?[5] Or should I also choose on behalf of those humans who
during their current life span cannot engage in rational future-aiming choices (like
permanently mentally handicapped ones; or children who never get to develop
their rationality because of untimely death)?
Rawls’ own view seems to be that strictly speaking the original contractor
represents only oneself. After all, a goal of Rawls’ theory is to motivate the
choice of a just system by first appealing to a person’s enlightened self-interest
(by inviting questions like: “To which social system would you choose to belong,
if you did not know which features and which position you would have in any of
the available systems?”). Since, however, any other rational person could
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replace “you” as the subject of this self-interested thought-experiment, without
changing the choice-results, Rawls’ “original contractor” ends up choosing for
any current (or, perhaps, any possible) rational being.[6]
This reasoning appears to imply that anyone permanently incapable of
engaging in this thought-experiment is not represented. Some humans are
clearly so incapable – due to genetic impairments, early disease, or early death.
Hence, some cognitively handicapped humans are not going to be represented in
Rawls’ imaginative exercise. Even if one were to take a generous reading of
rationality, as Rawls suggests, and have it apply not just to those who are
actually rational but also those who have the capacity or the potential for
rationality, the permanently impaired humans would still be left out.[7] Though
Rawls seems to be aware of this difficulty, he does nothing to resolve it.[8]
Might there be a less strict reading of Rawls that is more inclusive, and yet is
consistent with the impartial ethical goal of his position? I believe so. We would
need to put extra stress on the part of Rawls’ theory intended to protect the
interests of the weak and unfortunate (as captured, say, by the second part of
Rawls’ “difference principle”). Then we would need to enlarge the class of the
weak and unfortunate so as to include not only rational humans who happen to
be poor, unskilled, mediocre, sickly, but also (initially) humans whose potential
for rationality is either non-existent, or cut short. This more inclusive Rawlsian
stance could, then, result in a rational person (who takes up the ‘original
position” perspective) choosing also on behalf of non-rationally endowed
humans.[9]
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Why should one concern oneself with the risks and opportunities of the nonrationally endowed humans also?
The main reason for this is that any one of us who engages in this imaginative
game – who is currently fully rational – could find oneself in the role of the less
mentally endowed in the chosen hypothetical system. The facts of our world
make it highly likely that some humans are condemned to such a mentally
deprived status. The hypothetical society does not presuppose a change in the
current distribution of impaired human capacities. The physical and
psychological make up the constituents of the imagined society must remain
much like ours – and similarly with the limitations on resources, etc.
Consequently, impartiality and “self-interest” dictate that a rational “original”
chooser pick a system that would also serve the interests of less-endowed
humans. Recall, in this context, that the contractors are to possess general
knowledge about human psychology and sociology. They must know that people
have diverse talents and interests. They must be aware of the general types of
situations in which humans can find themselves (that people can be sick or
healthy, rich or poor, indebted or free from debt, in a healthy natural environment
or a degraded one, enslaved or free). This general knowledge must include the
possibility of humans finding themselves in the position of permanently mentally
handicapped individuals.[10] To rule this out this possibility is to imagine a world
considerably different than ours.
It would be a mistake, here to try to block this attempt at representing the
interests of human “non-rationals” by attacking the metaphysical possibility of a
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current rational person, P, becoming the cognitively deprived individual P*, in the
hypothetical chosen society.
Recall that a central purpose of Rawls’ imaginative what-if exercise is to
achieve a level of ethical impartiality – so that the contractor would not favor a
system simply because it provides advantages to the contractor’s own position in
it. To attain this impartiality Rawls does not really need P to imagine herself, P,
in that system. P could imagine someone she cares about being positioned in an
undetermined role in that system. That someone she cares about could be her
brother. For current purposes, it could be the disembodied soul of Socrates who
is ready to take on a new human incarnation in a randomly assigned role.
Suppose the latter were the case, and that I were asked to pick the system that
best maximizes Socrates’ soul’s opportunities and best minimizes its risks, which
system (which basic rules) would I choose on this soul’s behalf? That is the heart
of Rawls’ challenge. How the identity is preserved between, say, Socrates’
disembodied soul and the new embodiment is irrelevant for this ethical purpose
(or, in any case, a soul-substance mode of identity-preservation might do). The
usual way of construing Rawls’ exercise, with its self-interested appeal to the
contractor, may be practically useful but is really unnecessary. If this selfinterested aspect causes metaphysical problems, it could be dropped. I
conclude that the attempt to extend Rawls’ view to include non-rational humans
cannot be blocked by appealing to strict metaphysical identity requirements.
Someone could object that Socrates’ soul could only be imagined to take on
the role of a person, and non-rational humans are not “persons.” Perhaps a
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complex and rational mental life is necessary for personhood (Rawls himself
focuses only on “moral persons”). However, I am disputing precisely whether the
range of roles that Socrates’ soul could take on in Rawls’ ideal society – hence
the range of individuals falling under the scope of justice concerns – should be
confined to “persons” only. After all, we are to imagine a world like ours, as far
as constituents of a community.[11] Such a world will include non-rational humans
(hence humans who are not “persons”). I see no reason why Socrates’ soul could
not be such a human (I am assuming a randomly determined role-taking, not one
based on some karmic merit).[12]
I conclude, thus, that as an “original” contractor one must care about the
interests of the rationally less-endowed humans in the imagined alternate
society. By implication, one aspect of one’s current status that one must ignore is
one’s good fortune in the cognitive-rationality area. One’s current full rationality
must be viewed – at least for purposes of this exercise in ethical impartiality -- as
a contingent trait that, like natural physical talents, one need not have
possessed.[13]
Here is the second step. If the less rationally endowed can and would be
“members” of the chosen hypothetical system – not as active participants, but as
“patients” whose interests the rational “original” contractor must keep in mind in
choosing the right rules – then those less endowed in our current system would
have to have their interests now represented. We cannot treat their current
inability to engage in imaginative exercises as grounds for representational
exclusion. That is because their handicap must be viewed, for present ethical
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purposes, as a contingent misfortune (just as we should view our rational status
as a contingent good fortune). It is, after all, undeniable that one’s nervous
system being invaded, or not, by some strange virus during one’s infancy -leading to permanent brain damage –will determine whether or not one comes to
possess either this handicap or one’s rationality (and “personhood”).
!
If this last conclusion is plausible, it follows that when any one of us, as a
fully rational being, engages in the Rawslian “original position” exercise, he or
she should choose also on behalf of the less than rational humans. This would
be an extended and more compassionate version of Rawls’ view.[14] Rawls
perhaps would not have approved, but he should have!

Human and Non-Human Beneficiaries

A further implication becomes unavoidable. If humans who could not
themselves take part in the “original position” game must be represented by
those who can, then this representation would have to extend to that non-rational
group of non-humans whose current psychology approximates that of the
handicapped (like adult monkeys, horses, dolphins, and dogs). They certainly
have interests. They have some degree of rationality – they engage in meansends reasoning, they form relationships, they can be happy or sad, etc. So, why
exclude them – other than on speciesist grounds?
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Should they be excluded from representation on the grounds that their more
deprived (or perhaps just different) current status is contingent in a different way
than that of non-rational humans – in that their status as dog or chimp is
“natural”? It seems not, since the status of gifted humans is similarly “natural”
and no less contingent. Moreover, the status of some innately non-rational
humans is also due to “natural” conditions. Recall also that in some traditions –
the Buddhist and Hindu ones in particular – there are no strict boundaries
between human and non-human roles across our many alleged incarnations.
One’s basic “self” could take on both human and non-human forms. In such
traditions the contingency of the human form is much more evident.
Again, why, in principle, must a just society (or, more broadly, a just
community) include only humans? Why, more precisely, must matters of
distributive justice apply only to humans?
I understand that in our western traditions – and many others, such as the
Confucian -- justice concerns have not been applied to non-humans. However,
that fact alone counts for little. Just as our traditions have moved to include
slaves and women within the sphere of social justice, the same could happen
with respect to some non-humans. We are only beginning to seriously consider
non-humans in our moral discussions. Thus, in the future a recognized just
society might take on a more inclusive look.
A small scale parallel of a just community is the example of an extended
household. Such a household might include parents, children, weird uncles, cats
and dogs (particularly cats and dogs that are born within, or in some other
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“natural” way come to belong to, the confines of the household). The cats and
the dogs may not take part in the decisions regarding the running of this
household. However, their presence and their moral standing can surely have an
impact on what gets decided, and how the household resources get distributed.
The just household would not lock the crazy but harmless uncle in the dark
basement to avoid embarrassments with the neighbors; nor would the just
household starve the cats for the sake of a more luxurious set of curtains. Even
if the cats do no job – not even that of catching mice – they would still be fed (in
non-crises circumstances). A similarly more inclusive larger community could,
and I believe should, include as stakeholders not only active socio-political roleplayers, but also passive (or, better, less able) beneficiaries of social activities.
Among the passive beneficiaries why not include some non-humans?
Non-humans, in fact, have more of a claim to partake of resources in the
larger earthly community than they do in a typical small-scale household. In the
household case the resources at its disposal normally belong to the adult and
rational members of the household. The same cannot ultimately be said of many
earthly resources. No matter what our law books and religious texts say, we
cannot act as if natural resources were meant only for humans. Any extreme
anthropocentric view claiming exclusive human ownership of earthly resources
would need justification -- and I do not see it as forthcoming. Given the immense
portions of those resources that are currently subject to human control and to
their distributive choices and policies, non-humans must be included among the
stakeholders of these social choices and policies.[15]
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Possible Objections

The possible reasons for excluding non-humans as potential beneficiaries of
the veil of ignorance exercise are not convincing. Consider the most plausible
ones:
(A) Only humans can be considered in thinking of a just system!
This is blatantly speciesistic, without additional arguments. What if there
were smart and imaginative non-humans – angels or dolphins?

(B) Only those who have the genetic potential for full rationality should be
represented by the “original” contractor!
Genetic potential is too meager a condition. Having the genetic potential
for rationality, while lacking any actual possibility for it -- due to congenital
disease or infant death – is to have no potential at all for it in this current life.
If so, then this position reverts to the previous speciesist one.

(C) Well, then, the rational choosers must choose only on behalf of all (and
only) actual rational beings, and of those statistically likely to become so (like,
say, most twelve year olds).
This, as I argued, is unfair to those actual humans (and others?) who
happen to be mentally deprived. We lucky ones could have easily been born
or ended up in their shoes. Again, the genius of Rawls’ method lies in the veil
of ignorance. It lies in its getting us to choose a system’s just principles while
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ignoring our current position of privilege and good fortune (and other current
features we just happen to have). Yes, we are to use our full rationality in
choosing our ideal system; but we are not really entitled to treat that full
rationality as guaranteed in the imagined community. The key “rational”
feature that is supposed to count in the imagined future is that of some
content-neutral desire to maximize our well being. Such a desire can be
present – albeit with limited content-ranges -- in mentally handicapped
humans (and in non-humans similarly psychologically equipped).

(D) Justice is simply a political notion, and as such excludes those who
cannot participate in political activities.
Even if this narrow scope for justice were granted, the presence of
humans who are beneficiaries but non-participants (due to incapacity) in
political activities falsifies this exclusive claim. More importantly, there is no
reason to apply justice only to distribution issues within politics. Consider just
distribution issues in schools, households, or even nature. The distribution of
grades, for instance, in a classroom setting is clearly subject justice
concerns. In fact, a classroom of the “inclusive” variety -- having mentally
handicapped alongside highly intelligent students – provides a nice analogy to
the inclusive Rawlsian viewpoint I am proposing. The just teacher of an
“inclusive” group of students would not assign “grades” and other rewards
only on the basis of intellectual achievement. Some rewards could be
assigned for effort, for good behavior, or simply for being there. The teacher
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could justify this varied distribution scheme by inviting the Rawlsian question:
“If you were to belong to this hypothetical classroom without knowing your
role in it, how would you want your grades and other rewards to be
determined?”

(E) Morality is, in fact, a human construction. Morality is constructed by
human beings in order to facilitate interactions between human beings, and to
make possible a co-operative community. Since morality includes justice, the
latter is also a human construction. This is the point of contractarian views:
they aim at generating artificial “moral’ rules by appealing only to the selfinterest of the contractors.
This not only is not Rawls’ own view; even if it were, there is no
independent reason for us to agree with it.[16] We are entitled to hold that
certain practices are immoral independently of social agreements or
conventions (e.g., human sacrifices). In particular, our dealings with those
non-human beings that can suffer are moral dealings, since suffering is
undeniably a morally pertinent phenomenon. If this latter claim is inconsistent
with some contractarian views (among which Rawls’ view is often classified),
so much the worse for these contractarian views.
Fortunately, would-be dismissals of suffering or sentience as moral
phenomena are not essential traits of contractarianism. Rawls deserves
credit for his passing recognition of the moral relevance of animal suffering (“it
is wrong to be cruel to animals”).[17] He deserves criticism for claiming,
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regarding animals, that “it does not seem possible to extend the contract
doctrine so as to include them in a natural way.”[18] Including them in the
same category of non-rational but morally worthy humans is the natural way
of extending his contractarian view.

(F) Why must the well-being of rationally impaired creatures – both humans
and non-humans -- fall inside the sphere of distributive justice? Why could
their well-being be a matter of beneficence? This, after all, seems to be
Rawls’ actual view. Let the (fundamental rules for the) justice of a system
determine the allocation of desirable positions, financial rewards, and things
of this sort. Concerns for non-rational cohabitants who have some moral
standing but who cannot participate in the rules- and policy-making of a
society should be left to the wider moral duties of the social participants.
In response I will assume that justice deals with getting what one is due,
from those who owe one. As alluded to previously, if these non-rationals fell
outside the scope of the community that Rawls is envisaging, and had no
natural claim to the resources that this community will control and distribute,
then this objection would have some force. As it is, neither of these
conditions obtains. Any realistic current human community that aspires to
justice will include non-rationals of both the human and non-human variety.
Further, some of the resources that large scale modern communities – like
nations -- de facto control and allocate (according to just distribution
principles) have in effect been stolen or usurped. These are natural
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resources that humans have historically acquired by the forced dispossession
(and often killing) of members of other sentient species – even by forced
extinction of entire species. Such resources also belonged rightly to these
other creatures. Cats, dogs, chimps, dolphins, horses were not put into this
earth as human tools and possessions, but as independent fellow creatures (I
am dismissing some morally dubious religious claims here). We humans
have usurped most of their share of the earth by expanding recklessly, and by
conquering and destroying non-human sentient lives that were in the way.
Any just earthly current community must face up to these facts. Since the
manner in which big chunks of earthly resources are allocated – by human
organized policies -- is indeed one of the concerns of justice, justice bears
directly on the claims of our non-human co-travelers. Compensatory claims
advanced on behalf of many animal species would not, for example, be out of
the question in a cosmic tribunal.
Perhaps if the setting for a hypothetical just society were not (like) our
current world, but one without the history of animal abuse, and if the natural
resources were not to be shared with non-rational animals, things would be
different. In such a world only beneficence concerns might apply in our
dealings with other animals.
Again, we could go along with a Rawlsian imaginative exercise based on
an abstract model of our world, for certain limited purposes. In such a limited
exercise we could relegate concerns for animals to beneficence. However, we
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cannot be expected to extend the lessons derived from this limited exercise to
our much different world.

(G) If an “original position” contractor were to represent non-rational humans,
would this not result in too inclusive an imagined community? Would they not
have to include insects and plants? This result would be absurd.
Yes, the wider community here being hypothesized would be much more
inclusive. However, lines could still be drawn. Sentience could be the natural
cut off point. Only beings capable of feeling need be included. As suggested
previously, suffering and enjoyment are natural moral phenomena, whereas
wider traits like life are less clearly so.
Regarding how to recognize who does or does not possess sentience (do
insects? do plants?), this would be an empirical matter for proper scientists to
determine, and should not affect our principled position.

Conclusion

What are the likely results of including at least some non-humans within the
scope of those on whose behalf Rawls’ contractors choose?
A just system so derived will rest on rules that will guarantee at least some
consideration, some resources, and some protections for these non-humans. A
Rawlsian ideal society would permit differential treatments in many areas (wealth
and educational opportunities, for example), but recall that these differences and
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gaps must work also for the benefit of the less fortunate. The class of the “less
fortunate” which would benefit from permissible inequities would simply be more
inclusive than Rawls thought it should be.
What would the inclusion of these non-rational beings among the claimants of
justice mean? This would have to be worked out with more care than I can do
here. Presumably, however, we could establish a range outside of which the
proper set of justice-duties must not fall. On one end of this range, the mentally
handicapped and many psychologically similar non-humans could not claim
access to social roles and resources that rest on advanced intellectual
prerequisites (such as to political participation or to major educational
opportunities). Nor could they claim luxurious lifestyles that would suck too many
resources from the system – making it unproductive, and thus unable to sustain
itself and sustain these weaker members. On the other end of the range, they
would have a legitimate claim not to be eaten or to be used for scientific
experiments (at least not in normal and non-“lifeboat” circumstances).
I hope that this implication is moderate and reasonable. My proposal
Is a moderate cousin of the “equal basic rights” view made famous by Tom
Regan – who has similar lines of objection to Rawls.[19] I am not advocating a
rights perspective (certainly not some “equal rights” perspective). My general
view is closer to a common sense (and utilitarian) “harm” perspective. I hold that
those who can be harmed should be given some moral consideration. How
much consideration they deserve would depend on their level of psychological
capacities, and on the nature of the circumstances (including circumstances of
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shared resources, and of historical treatment). I am convinced of the following
minimalist principle: if the fully-rational beings (who oversee and distribute the
resources, opportunities, roles, in a community) can provide for their own serious
needs without violating the serious interests (such as life and non-suffering) of
the sentient but not-fully-rational members of that community, they ought to do
so.[20]
This minimalist approach need not contradict the spirit of Rawls’ position. In
particular, it need not call into question the non-egalitarian features of his view.
He wants a system in which the demand for equality of treatment not result in
egalitarian social arrangements that would stifle the opportunities and
motivations of the more gifted humans (or, better, rational beings). Rawls’ veil of
ignorance thought-experiment indicates that none of us would want to be born in
a system that would stifle our opportunities, should we turn out to be highly
talented. This non-egalitarian concern is consistent with my minimalist but not
speciesist understanding of “social arrangements” (that includes some animals
as deserving to be among the also-beneficiaries of social inequalities).

[1]

No society can remove natural injustices derived from unequal natural talents

and limitations.
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[2]

One could apply this impartiality-fostering intuition in many other contexts.

Students, for instance, could be asked to choose which rules should govern
classroom interactions (say, regarding grading) by imagining themselves in the
class while not knowing whether they will be the student or the teacher, a bright
student or a dull one, a shy or a talkative one, etc. One could apply this intuition
to determine the right family interactions, by imagining not knowing if one is the
parent or the child. One could apply it, as Rawls goes on to do, in the areas of
international relations, and intergenerational relations. The flexibility and
generality of this imaginative approach, in resolving distributive issues, is a major
sign of its validity.
[3]

With regard to normal children Rawls is willing to allow that as long as they

have the potential for becoming rational , they should deserve “the full protection
of the principles of justice.”
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971),
sect. 77, p. 509.
I do not suppose this to mean that as children they are eligible to be
original contractors. His reasoning seems to be that since they could become so
eligible, they should be treated as equal beneficiaries of the contract. Or perhaps
the reasoning is that since it matters not when one engages in the contract
thought-experiment, the fact that at a particular time they are not ready to so
engage does not matter. If they can do so at some time, say a later one, then
they count as possible contractors (see note # 4).

Between the Species VI August 2006 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

20
[4]

Rawls flirted with having the original choosers imagine turning out to be heads

of families in the imagined society. This was intended to prompt the “contractors”
into caring about the effects of social arrangements on one’s immediate family
descendants. On such a view, would Rawls’ contractor choose on behalf of the
members of one’s current family (in some special way, besides choosing on their
behalf as typical rational humans)? The other members of the contractor’s
current family might turn out, in the hypothetical future, to belong to other
families.
Rawls’ concern in his early remarks about family lines is that that the rules
of the system picked not permit the exhaustion of natural resources during any
one generation – the difference principle would have to apply to future people
(one is also not supposed to know the temporal location of one’s imagined
system).
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sect. 22, p. 128.

[5]

This appears to be Rawls’ own view. He writes:
“…the original position is not to be thought of as a general assembly which
includes at one moment everyone who will live at some time; much less,
as an assembly of everyone who could live at some time. It is not a
gathering of all actual or possible persons. To conceive of the original
position in either of these ways is to stretch fantasy too far; the conception
would cease to be a natural guide to intuition. In any case, it is important
that the original position be interpreted so that one can at any time adopt
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its perspective. It must make no difference when one takes up this
viewpoint, or who does…” [italics mine]
A Theory of Justice, sect. 24, p. 139.

[6]

See previous note. Recall that one appears to choose on behalf of those

present young children who in actuality do become rational. I suppose these
children fall in the category of possible rational beings. I also suppose that the
same cannot be said for those children who die in infancy.
In regard to who is entitled to equal justice in the hypothesized society, Rawls’
answer is that this status is confined to “moral persons” – beings having a
conception of the good, and having a sense of justice to some minimal degree.
See, A Theory of Justice, sect.77, p. 505-506.
[7]

See, A Theory of Justice, sect.77, p. 509.

[8]

He states that “those more or less permanently deprived of moral personality

may present a difficulty. I cannot examine this problem here.”
A Theory of Justice, sect.77, p. 510.
See similar comments in John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 21.
[9]

There are hints of the possibility of this more compassionate stance in Rawls.

For instance, Rawls contends that
“Undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth
and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow
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compensated for…. [I]n order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine
equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer
native assets.” (italics mine)
A Theory of Justice, pp. 100-101.
He also says this about “having a sense of justice,” which appears to be a
necessary condition for deserving equal justice consideration in his imagined
society:
“…While individuals presumably have varying capacities for a sense of
justice, this fact is not a reason for depriving those with lesser capacity of
the full protection of justice. Once a certain minimum is met, a person is
entitled to equal liberty on a par with everyone else.” (italics mine)
A Theory of Justice, p. 506.
We would simply need to lower the minimum capacity, below that envisaged by
Rawls himself, to arrive at my more compassionate Rawlsian position.
[10]

That this is a revised stance, and not necessarily Rawls’ own stance – his

stance requiring that a member of the hypothesized system be a “moral person,”
who in turn possesses a sense of justice and a conception of the good – should
not distract us.
Naturally, in Rawls’ defense, it is perfectly legitimate to use an abstract
model of the real world (see following note). Scientists and philosophers do this
all the time, and with good results. It is, thus, legitimate to think about what rights
and duties a group consisting only of fully (or minimally) rational individuals would
have vis-à-vis each other. Such an abstract exercise might yield some results
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that are useful for certain purposes. One such result would be an answer to the
question: “What is the just society for a group of rational humans with diverse
conceptions of the good?” And this result might, in turn, explain why basic
freedom-rights (with limits for mutual protection of each other’s freedoms) are
essential in any just society.
Note, however, how the extent of the limits on such a group’s freedoms
could change once this model is extended to the real world. Because in the real
world there are also non-rational beings with significant moral status, the
limitations on freedom must go beyond the rationals’ mutual self-protection.
Such limitations must also deal with the well being of morally worthy nonrationals.
[11]

Rawls would perhaps dispute this. There are many indications that he is

asking us to imagine an abstract model of our world. Such a model limits its
focus on rational and “roughly equal” constituents, so as to draw specific
principles of justice that apply only to such equals. Thus, for instance, in the
Dewey Lectures he claims that his “cooperating members of society” must have
“sufficient intellectual powers to play a normal part in society”, so as to avoid
“difficult complications” so as to “work out a theory that covers the fundamental
case” and later “try to extend it to other cases.”
Rawls, John, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, The Journal of
Philosophy 77 (1980), p. 546.
See, also, similar claims in John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 20-21
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[12]

Could one object here that Socrates could not have been a human non-

person (while he could have been a female instead of a male, Chinese instead of
Greek, a shepherd instead of a philosopher, etc.)? If he could have been these
other types of humans, I see no reason why he could not have been cognitively
so disabled as not to have rationality.
[13]

I am aware that for a long line of thinkers, going through Kant back to

Aristotle, rationality may be a sine qua non of moral standing and even of
humanity as a species However, in the real world there are plenty of humans, to
whom we ordinarily attribute moral standing, that lack most cognitive powers
linked with rationality and imagination. Most of us have some loved ones so
deprived – whether their cognitive deprivations are native or acquired. Having the
rational powers necessary to carry out the Rawlsian thought-experiment is an
undeniably fortunate contingency, even if statistically it is the norm among
humans (and even if we do not normally speak of good fortune in connection with
having such faculties).
See, in this connection, Rawls’ brief and revealing comment on cruelty to
animals. A Theory of Justice, sect.77, p. 512.
[14]

Such a “trustee” view is suggested, but not endorsed, by Thomas Scanlon as

a possible way out “for contractarian” views.
Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999) pp. 177-187.
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In a brief discussion of such a “trustee” possibility Martha Nussbaum
rejects it on surprisingly unconvincing grounds. She claims that within a
contractarian context the “trustee” view would call for respecting the interests of
the mentally handicapped, etc., “only on account of some relationship in which
they stand to the so-called ‘fully-cooperating’ people;” that is, only because a
“contracting party cares about their interests.”
Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally
Disabled Citizens (The Religion and Culture Web Forum, The University of
Chicago, March 2003), p. 19.
Since I am not basing my present form of “trustee” solution for the
mentally disabled on an indirect care-relationship, but on the claim that a rational
“original contractor” could have been currently in their place, and could be in their
place in the imagined community, I am not impressed by Nussbaum’s otherwise
legitimate concern.
[15]

I am assuming, again, that the imagined Rawlsian community is not an

abstract model of our world (where issues of interspecific property/resource
claims are set aside). I am assuming that it reflects the rich complexity of this
world.
[16]

Rawls allows for there to be a broader sense of morality outside the realm of a

theory of justice (captured by a contract view). He writes:
“…We should recall the limits of a theory of justice. Not only are many
aspects of morality left aside but no account is given of right conduct in
regard to animals and the rest of nature. A conception of justice is but one
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part of a moral view. While I have not maintained that the capacity for a
sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it
does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to
creatures lacking this capacity. But it does not follow that there are no
requirements at all in regard to them, or in our relations with the natural
order. Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a
whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure
and pain and for forms of life of which animals are capable clearly impose
duties of compassion and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to
explain these considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of a theory of
justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so
as to include them in a natural way. A correct conception of our relations
to animals and to nature would seem to depend upon a theory of the
natural order and our place in it.”
A Theory of Justice, sect.77, p. 512.
I am arguing that there is a rather obvious way to extend the “contract”
doctrine to include at least the justice duties to at least some animals. I suspect
that it is precisely due to presupposed speciesist and anthropocentric theories “of
the natural order” that justice duties are viewed as not owed to animals.
[17]

[18]

Ibid.
Ibid.

[19]

See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of
California Press, 1983), ch. 5.4.
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[20]

I find myself tending to agree with the position taken by Donald VanDeVeer,

“Interspecific Justice,” Inquiry, Vol 22, No. 1-2 (Summer 1979).
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